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Chapter 1: Introduction   
Socrates: “To fear death, gentleman, is no other than to think oneself wise when one is not, to think one 
knows what one does not know. No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all blessings for 
man, yet men fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils.”1 
Death is no stranger to us humans. We see or hear about death almost on a daily basis, some may 
fear it whilst others seek to accept it. With the increasing knowledge in a society of medical 
diseases and treatments, end of life decisions is no more a rare occurrence. With the increase in 
medical technology over the years the lines that clearly defined life and death have become 
blurred. Previously death was viewed as a natural occurrence and accepted as the will of God by 
some; nowadays there are decisions that revolve around whether a person is legally dead or not. 
The legal definition of death is defined as “brain death” as stated in the National Health Act.2 The 
ability to keep a person alive through prolonged mechanical ventilation and artificial feeding 
makes it difficult in deciding whether a person is in fact dead. This prolongation of life may not be 
the ideal way of living for some people and that’s when the advanced directive comes into focus.  
An advanced directive can be in two forms namely that of a treatment directive whereby a 
competent person drafts a living will with prospective medical decisions for future treatment. The 
other is in the form of a durable power of attorney where a surrogate decision maker is chosen in 
advance by a patient to make treatment decisions. It should be noted that this dissertation shall 
focus on both types of advanced directives but more specifically on those that choose a surrogate 
decision maker. In practice doctors are more likely to abide by an advanced directive, it is when a 
surrogate decision maker is appointed that issues arise. The reason behind this is that in South 
Africa, a power of attorney usually ends when a person loses his or her mental capacity. This means 
that an appointed person can no longer make a health care decision on behalf of the person who 
is now mentally incompetent.   
A living will is an advanced directive provided by a patient as a form of instruction regarding their 
future medical treatment, should they become unable to consent or to refuse treatment. 3  It 
                                                     
1 GMA Grube and JM Cooper The Trial and Death of Socrates 3 ed (2001) 27. 
2 In terms of section 1 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003, the moment of death is defined as “brain death.” 
3 D McQuoid Mason and M Dada A—Z Medical Law (2011) 258. 
4 Clarke v Hurst No and Others 1992 (4) SA 630 (D). 
5 Manto Tshabalala Msimang.  
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should be noted that throughout this dissertation when referring to advanced directives it would 
be in regard to the living will or a durable power of attorney for healthcare. Both terms shall be in 
reference to a statement made by a patient in regard to future medical treatment should the 
patient become incompetent and unable to express his or her wishes.  
Within the South African legal framework advanced directives have received minimal attention 
indicative in the case of Clarke v Hurst.4 Several years ago through the advice of the Late Nelson 
Mandela, the SA Law Commission tabled recommendations to Parliament which incorporated the 
concepts of physician-assisted suicide and advanced directives. However, at the time the then 
Minister of Health5 failed to look at the recommendations but preferred rather to focus on other 
health issues of that time. As it stands South Africa has failed to legally recognise advanced 
directives. The provision of legal clarity would be beneficial in assisting patients, healthcare 
practitioners and family members in making important health care decisions especially in respect 
of withdrawal or withholding of life-saving treatment.  
 
1.1. Purpose and Significance of Dissertation  
The purpose of this dissertation is to promote the awareness of advanced directives. The idea is to 
highlight the advantages of legislative recognition of advanced directives. There is a gap that exists 
whereby ethically and in health care practice an advanced directive is recognized. Yet legally it is 
neither accepted nor rejected arguably it appears to be overlooked. In clinical practice, doctors 
generally abide by advanced directives; the issue arises when a health care directive includes a 
durable power of attorney, or when the advanced directive states one decision but the family 
members make another decision. In an already frustrating working environment, it can create a 
lot of anxiety and confusion if not dealt with through legislation. legislation would then serve as a 
reference point for both doctors and patients alike in respect of advanced directives and durable 
powers of attorney. Legally a power of attorney ends with competency when a person becomes 
mentally incompetent a power of attorney ends. In respect of a health care power of attorney, this 
has the potential to be confusing. There exists a need for legal clarity surrounding advanced 
directives and when they become enforceable as well as legally binding. Understandably a health 
practitioner may feel uncertain or fearful of litigation in a situation where a surrogate decision 
3  
  
maker decides to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. Issues may even arise when there are 
competing surrogate decision makers who may disagree on a treatment plan.    
 
1.2. Objective of the dissertation  
It is the aim of this dissertation to demonstrate that the legal recognition of advanced directives, 
namely that of durable powers of attorney for healthcare needs legal clarity within our current 
legal dispensation. The aim is to promote the legal recognition and the use of advanced directives 
within South African healthcare facilities whilst considering the resource restraints in our country. 
Importantly, this dissertation will look at the need for legal clarity within our own constitutional 
dispensation. Essentially patients who wish to draft an advanced directive should feel a sense of 
certainty that their wishes are recognised and respected legislatively.  In order to remedy this 
situation, suggestions shall be put forward in order to bridge the gap between the ethically 
accepting position and the legal non-recognition of advanced directives in South Africa. Since 
South Africa does not have legislation specific to advanced directives, other countries such as the 
United States (it should be noted that even though the United States has a federated system, 
advanced directives have been given legal recognition in some form or the other within all of the 
States), Canada and the United Kingdom are looked at to see how they deal with advanced 
directives. These countries have been selected for the following reasons, certain States within the 
United States were the first to introduce a living will and have managed to successfully develop it 
over the years. Canada and the United Kingdom have recently been focusing on end-of-life 
decisions and considering South Africa’s common law link with these countries these jurisdictions 
have been selected. It should be noted that mentioning these other jurisdictions serves merely as 
a guideline and is not binding on our legal system.  
There are some questions that need clarity with regard to a durable power of attorney in 
healthcare:  
• Would there be instances where a surrogate decision maker’s decision can be overridden 
by another family member or a healthcare practitioner, even when it complies with the 
law?   
4  
  
• Can a surrogate decision maker decide that life sustaining treatment be removed even if it 
may inadvertently lead to hastening a person’s death?  
• How does a health care practitioner deal with two surrogate decision makers who have 
opposing decisions on the treatment of the patient?  
• And would a health care practitioner be protected against a medical negligence claim 
provided that the decisions made are within the standard of care in medical practice?  
  
1.3. Background   
The National Health Act 4  provides that everyone has the right to participate in any decision 
affecting his or her personal health and treatment.5 This can be interpreted to suggest that section 
8 only affords a person the right to participate in a decision and does not appear to suggest that a 
person’s decision should take precedent; it is merely a suggestive factor. Furthermore, the Act6 
does not make reference to advanced directives or living wills. It would be much easier to 
understand if proper terminology like living will and durable power of attorney was used in the 
Act 7  even though clarity does not stop at terminology. In addition, the National Health 
Regulations8 alternatively does provide for the recognition of the patient’s privacy and dignity 
which would encompass the right to die with dignity. This has been premised on the underlying 
principle to act in accordance with the World Medical Association Declaration of Venice on 
Terminal Illness.9 This Declaration looks at issues of care of terminally ill patients by placing the 
responsibility on the physician to assist the patient “in maintaining an optimal quality of life 
through controlling symptoms and addressing psychosocial needs enabling the patient to die with 
dignity and in comfort”.10 The Declaration makes further provisions that physicians should take 
                                                     
4 National Health Act 61 of 2003.  
5 Sec 8(1) of the National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
6 National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
7 Ibid.   
8 Norms and Standards Regulations in terms of Section 90 (1) (b) and (c) of the National Health Act 61 of 2003, 
applicable to certain categories of health establishments. No. R. 109, 18 February 2015. 
9 World Medical Association Declaration of Venice on Terminal Illness. Adopted by the 35th World Medical Assembly, 
Venice, Italy, October 1983 and revised by the 57th WMA General Assembly, Pilanesberg, South Africa, October 
2006. https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-venice-on-terminal-illness/. (accessed on 12 January 
2018). 
10 Ibid. 
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steps in encouraging patients to develop written advanced directives. The South African Patient 
Rights Charter provides for patient’s right to refuse treatment; however, it fails to mention 
advanced directives. 11  The south African legislation does not specifically contain provisions 
regulating advanced directives or living wills.   
In the case of Clarke v Hurst12 the patient had drafted a living will expressing his wish that he not 
be kept alive through artificial methods. However, the judgment was not based upon recognizing 
the advanced directive. There was mention of the living will but it did not form the basis of the 
court reaching its decision. The Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) guidelines for 
the Withholding and Withdrawing of Treatment booklet state that “patients should be given the 
opportunity and encouraged to write advanced directives”. 13  As the years progressed more 
recognition was given to patients and their choice to refuse treatment. Internationally, there has 
been an increase towards legal recognition of advanced directives. Despite this South Africa has 
failed to make a leap towards legally recognizing advanced directives namely durable powers of 
attorney for healthcare.   
 
1.4. Breakdown of Dissertation   
The dissertation shall look at advanced directives critically within the South African legal 
framework. The chapters of this dissertation shall be as follows:    
Chapter 1 – The first chapter shall provide a broad overview of the topic and look at the purpose  
of the dissertation and the background to the topic within South Africa.                                                              
Chapter 2 - This chapter will focus on the legal history and development of advanced directives by 
looking at its inception in the United States and other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom 
and Canada.   
                                                     
11 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guideline for Good Practice in the Health Care Professions National 
Patients’ Rights Charter Booklet 3 (2008).  
12 Clarke v Hurst supra.  
13 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guideline for the Withholding and Withdrawing of Treatment Booklet 
12 (2008).  
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Chapter 3 - This chapter will examine the ethical considerations surrounding advanced directives 
within South Africa, which will be discussed and analyzed. The concept of patient autonomy 
namely prospective patient autonomy shall be focused upon.  
Chapter 4 – The fourth chapter will focus on the constitutional and legal principles surrounding 
advanced directives. Such as section 10 of the Constitution which is the right to dignity. Section 12 
which encompasses the right to freedom and security of the person which includes the right to 
bodily and psychological integrity. Section 15 provides the right to freedom of thought, belief and 
opinion. Section 7 of the National Health Act14 makes provision for the importance of patient 
autonomy.   
Chapter 5 – This is the last chapter and it shall conclude the dissertation. The chapter will be divided 
focusing on advanced directives and surrogate decision making in healthcare respectively. 
Advantages, as well as recommendations, will be put forth in this concluding chapter.  
 
1.5. Terminology and Definitions  
For the sake of clarity and to prevent misunderstanding of the terms referred to some of the key 
terms or words shall be defined below:  
1.5.1. Advanced Care Planning   
Advance care planning is a communication process where people plan for a time when they are 
unable to make decisions for themselves. It includes reflection, deliberation, and determination of 
a person’s values and wishes or preferences for treatments at the end of life.15  
1.5.2. Advanced Directives   
Advanced directives are “instructions given by patients regarding their future treatment should 
they become incompetent to consent to, or refuse such treatment.”16  An advanced directive 
                                                     
14 Act 61 of 2003.  
15  M Howard, C Bernard, A Tan, M Slaven and D Klein “Advance Care Planning: Let’s Start Sooner” (1996) Canadian 
Family Physician 663– 665.  
16 D McQuoid Mason “Advanced Directives and the National Health Act” (2006) 12 South African Medical Journal 
1236.  
7  
  
allows a person to have the opportunity of making a future medical decision or to elect a proxy to 
make a medical decision for a patient who is unable to make a decision for themselves.  
1.5.3. Living Wills   
Living wills are advance directives which state “that if a person suffers from an incurable disease 
or injury that cannot be successfully treated, artificial life-sustaining treatment should be withheld 
or withdrawn and the patient left to die naturally.”17 The Living Will is a form of an advanced 
directive and is written when a person is competent and wishes to make a medical decision for the 
future. In some instances, and dependent on the wording of the living will and the condition of the 
patient, such a directive may be interpreted to include a request for a Do-Not-Resuscitate order.18  
1.5.4. Durable Power of Attorney  
A durable power of attorney in health care refers to a situation where a person elects someone 
else to make health care decisions on the patient’s behalf. This is usually seen in circumstances 
where a patient is mentally incompetent and unable to make a healthcare decision. Patients 
usually elect a family member to make such a decision on behalf of the patient. This type of power 
of attorney is referred to as a durable power of attorney since it remains in effect even if the 
patient becomes mentally incompetent.  
1.5.5. Do-Not-Resuscitate Order (DNR)  
Do-not-resuscitate orders refer to instructions by doctors to health professionals not to resuscitate 
patients who require cardiopulmonary resuscitations (CPR) in order to save their lives in situations 
where attempts to apply CPR to them would be futile.19 Do-not-resuscitate orders are also issued 
when CPR is against the wishes of the patient or persons legally able to consent on the patient’s 
behalf.20  
                                                     
17 I Kennedy and A Grubb Medical Law: Text with Materials, 2 ed (1994) 1334-1339.  
18 D McQuoid Mason “Emergency medical treatment and do not resuscitate orders: when can they be used?” (2013) 
103(4) South African Medical Journal 223.   
19 Ibid.  
20 D McQuoid Mason and M Dada A—Z Medical Law (2011) 167. 
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1.5.6. Patient Autonomy  
This is one of the most fundamental concepts of medical practice. It was a concept that was initially 
introduced in the South African case of Richter and another v Estate Hammann21  and further 
cemented as a legal principle in the case of Castell v De Greef.22 Regarding medical decision-
making, the concept of patient autonomy protects the patient’s right to self-determination, 
informed consent and the right to make informed decisions without undue influence from a 
medical professional.23 Patient autonomy is an important concept in arguing for the legal validity 
of advanced directives in health care, with consideration of the patient’s wishes.   
These principles are based on the notion of respect for the right to bodily and psychological 
integrity and the right to security and control of one’s body, as stated in section 12 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.24  
1.5.7. Terminal Illness  
Terminal illness refers to an illness, injury or other physical or mental condition that in reasonable 
medical judgment will inevitably cause the untimely death of the patient concerned. And which is 
causing the patient extreme suffering; or causes a persistent and irreversible vegetative condition 
with the result that no meaningful existence is possible for the patient.25  
1.5.8. Persistent Vegetative State (PVS)  
Persistent vegetative state has been defined as “long term unconsciousness caused by damage to 
the faculties of the brain that control higher mental functions” (whereby the basic functions such 
                                                     
21 Richter and another v Estate Hammann 1967 (3) SA 226 (C).   
22 Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C).  
23 H Manyonga, G Howarth, Dinwoodie M, Nisselle P and Whitehouse S “From informed consent to shared decision-
making” (2014) 104 South African Medical Journal 356.  
24 R Britz and A le Roux-Kemp “Voluntary informed consent and good clinical practice for clinical research in South 
Africa: ethical and legal perspectives” (2012) 102 South African Medical Journal 7. 
25 South African Law Commission. Proposed End of Life Decisions Act (South Africa Law Commission’s Final Draft Bill). 
(1999) 209. 
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as respiratory and cardiac function are not affected).26 The patient has no response to stimuli such 
as pain, movement of the eyes may occur as well as random movements of the limbs.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
26 D McQuoid Mason and M Dada A—Z Medical Law (2011) 32.   
27 Ibid.   
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Chapter 2: History and Development of Advanced Directives from an International Law 
Perspective 
2.1. The American Perspective   
This chapter shall focus on the inception of advanced directives in the United States, United 
Kingdom and Canada respectively.   
A concept that was initiated in the United States the first living will was proposed by attorney Luis 
Kutner, where his arguments for legal recognition appeared in the Indiana Law Journal.28 Kutner 
was a human rights lawyer, in Chicago, who represented the Euthanasia Society of America.29 He 
based this concept on the premise of common and constitutional law which provided that “a 
patient may not be subjected to treatment without his consent.”30 Kutner made the suggestion 
that a patient should indicate in writing the extent he or she consents to future treatment. He 
referred to the document as a “living will,” “a declaration determining the termination of life,” or 
a “testament permitting death,” among other names.31 Kutner considered the living will as a 
“revocable or unconditional trust with the patient’s body being the res, the hospital and doctors 
as the trustees, and the beneficiary being the patient.”32 His testamentary and trust paradigm 
shared the same characteristics as the legal approach that the United States initially adopted in 
their advanced directive legislation.   
In the year 1976 California adopted the first living will statute that created its Directive to 
Physicians and was termed a living will. This living will aimed at offering an incentive for both the 
patient and the doctor. The patient was offered a standardized tool that allowed the patient to 
express his or her wishes with regard to life-sustaining treatment either to withhold or withdraw 
treatment in the event of unconsciousness or a terminal condition.33 The doctor, on the other 
hand, was given statutory immunity when they complied with the patient’s wishes in good faith 
even though it is presumed that doctors should respect their patient’s wishes.34 
                                                     
28 L Kutner “Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal” (1969) 44 (4) Indiana Law Journal 550-551. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid.   
33 CP Sabatino “The Evolution of Health Care Advance Planning Law and Policy” (2010) 88(2) The Milbank Quarterly 
213.  
34 Ibid.   
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The need for legislation covering advanced care directives in the United States was sparked by 
three cases namely:  
The 1976 United States Supreme Court decision of Re Quinlan35 was a case involving a 21-year-old 
Karen Quinlan who had stopped breathing and fell into a coma or persistent vegetative state in 
1975.36 Her condition was said to have been brought upon after she had consumed alcohol and a 
sedative referred to as Quaalude while on a crash diet. The legal battle began when her parents 
had requested that her artificial ventilator be removed so that she may be allowed to die. The 
doctors disinclined to do so claiming such removal would amount to murder. The court in its 
decision stated that families were adequate decision makers regarding healthcare decisions for 
patients who were mentally incapacitated.37 The court further put forth the concept of a prognosis 
committee later to be what we know as a clinical ethics committee, in an attempt to assist in such 
causes without judicial measures being sought.38 In this case, artificial nutrition and hydration 
were not stopped and Karen passed away from pneumonia some 10 years later after the court had 
granted her artificial ventilation be stopped. The reason behind her artificial nutrition and 
hydration being continued was based on the fact that her parents had not requested for it to be 
removed. Hence even after the artificial ventilation was stopped for Karen, she continued to 
breathe unassisted and passed away from the infection. This case highlights an interesting point, 
in that when a surrogate decision maker makes a decision it has to be specific in respect of the 
treatment that is being refused. This was evident when the court had decided artificial ventilation 
could be stopped, yet it made no decision on artificial nutrition and hydration. Later on in this 
dissertation, a distinction will be drawn between the Canadian case of Bentley v Maplewood39 
where one of the issues the court looked at was whether or not nutrition and hydration was 
included in the definition of healthcare.  
In 1990 came the landmark US Supreme Court case of Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of 
Health.40 Nancy Beth Cruzan was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident in 1976 resulting in 
her being in a persistent vegetative state. Her parents requested her artificial nutrition and 
                                                     
35 Re Quinlan 1976 (355) A. 2d 647- NJ: Supreme Court. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid.   
38 Ibid.  
39 Bentley v Maplewood Seniors Care Society (2015) BCCA 91.  
40 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health (1990) 497 U.S. 261. 
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hydration be ceased. The argument, in this case, was about the right of other people in deciding 
to allow her to die through starvation. After several court hearings, the US Supreme Court ruled 
that artificial nutrition and hydration be withdrawn. A decision that was based on the right to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment and the testaments of people who knew Nancy and put forward 
sufficient evidence that Nancy would not have wanted to be kept alive in a persistent vegetative 
state.  
The third case involved Terri Schiavo41, a case which was highly publicized and involved a gruelling 
legal battle fraught with State and federal politicians all the way to then-President George W. Bush. 
It was a case that lasted many years from the year 1990 all the way to 2005. In 1990, Theresa Marie 
Schiavo suffered a cardiac arrest one that had caused a hypoxic state resulting in her being in a 
persistent vegetative state. In 1998 her husband requested that her feeding tube be removed 
stating that Terri would not have wanted to be kept alive in a persistent vegetative state. 
Unfortunately, no advanced directive regarding healthcare had been written by Terri stating her 
wishes. This case was a good example that illustrated the advantage of having an advanced 
healthcare directive. Drafting an advanced health care directive can help in avoiding lengthy court 
battles, the emotional agony and division of decisions that may occur within families with regard 
to treatment as was witnessed in the aforesaid case.  
These three abovementioned US decisions highlighted the importance of an advance health care 
directive. After the Quinlan case, the first laws in support of advanced care directives or living wills 
were enacted in California namely the Natural Death Act in 1976.42The Uniform Rights of the 
Terminally Ill Act as amended in 1989 sought to regulate advanced directives but the scope was 
limited to only patients who were suffering from a terminal illness. This was not acceptable 
considering the narrow scope of the Act that only provides for affected persons whose illness was 
incurable and irreversible, whose death would occur soon and who was unable to participate in a 
treatment decision. Over the course of ten years, there was an escalation in living will laws 
resulting in forty-one States adopting such legislation by the year 1986. As the laws were passed 
policymakers decided to adopt another legal document known as the durable power of attorney.43  
                                                     
41 Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo (2005) 11th Circuit, Court of Appeals.  
42 The Natural Death Act of 1976. 
43  CP Sabatino “Death in the Legislature: Inventing Legal Tools for Autonomy” (1992) 19(2) New York University 
Review of Law and Social Change 39.  
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The Patient Self-Determination Act44 was enacted in 1990 and attempted to address the issue of 
increasing the awareness of advance healthcare directives. This was established by advising all 
patients of their right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. The legislators realised that such an 
appointment came with its own downfalls and therefore the States began to develop a special 
durable power of attorney for health care statutes or alternatively adding proxy provisions to their 
living will statute.45 Due to a lack of understanding and use of the advanced directives a new wave 
of legislation ensued in 1991. New Jersey enacted the first combined statute one that merged a 
living will and the durable power of attorney also known as a proxy directive into one healthcare 
directive.46 As the waves of legislation on advance care directives continued, legislation covering 
do-not-resuscitate orders and default surrogate healthcare decision-makers were 
promulgated. 47 In 1993 the Uniform Law Commission promulgated the Uniform Healthcare 
Decisions Act,48 which consolidated various state laws that dealt with adult health care and health 
care powers of attorney. The basic principle of the Act49 is that a person may make any health care 
decision which would still remain in force when that person loses capacity. Unfortunately, not all 
states have adopted this Act,50 there are six states who have adopted it namely Hawaii, New 
Mexico, Mississippi, California, Delaware and Maine.51 The Act52 attempts to create an easier 
pathway for a person to make a healthcare decision.  
Interestingly, a systematic review was conducted in 2014 on the effectiveness of advanced 
directives. The outcome of the observational study indicated a decrease in the rate of 
hospitalization. There was a decrease in deaths in hospitals, a decrease in the use of life-sustaining 
treatment, and an increased use of hospice and palliative care. This review indicates that advanced 
directives can have a positive impact on patient care. 53  The effectiveness of an advanced 
                                                     
44 The Patient Self Determination Act of 1990.  
45 CP Sabatino “The Evolution of Health Care Advance Planning Law and Policy” (2010) 88(2) The Milbank Quarterly 
215.  
46 CP Sabatino Advance Directives and Advance Care Planning: Legal and Policy Issues (2007).  
47 CP Sabatino “The Evolution of Health Care Advance Planning Law and Policy” (2010) 88(2) The Milbank Quarterly 
214-215. 
48 Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act of 1993.  
49 Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act of 1993.   
50 Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act of 1993. 
51 The Health Care Decisions Act of 1993.   
52 The Health Care Decisions Act of 1993. 
53 A Brinkman-Stoppelenburg , JA Rietjens  and A van der Heide “The effects of advance care planning on end-of-life 
care: a systematic review” (2014) 28 Palliative Medicine 1000.  
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healthcare directive within the context of South Africa is a point that shall be explored further on 
in chapter five of this dissertation.  
 2.1.1. Legal Transactional Approach Versus Communications Approach  
Initially, American legislation focused on advanced directives with a legal transactional approach 
which later shifted to a more communications approach. 54  Historically the focus was 
predominantly on procedural aspects emphasizing standardised forms, which was a way to protect 
against abuse or an error. However, over the past two decades, there has been a shift towards a 
more flexible and communication-based approach.55 These approaches shall be further discussed 
in the following two paragraphs: 
Legal Transactional Approach 
The legal transactional approach focused on legal steps and procedural requirements setting out 
what was required for an advanced directive to be legally valid.  An advanced directive was treated 
more along the lines of a contract or conveyance of interest in property.56 It involved what was 
known as a substituted judgment which required a surrogate decision maker to make a treatment 
decision in the same manner that a patient would have decided.57 The patient’s advanced directive 
was considered as the gold standard in respect of the patient’s wishes.    
The idea behind the stringent legal formalities was to enforce the seriousness of creating an 
advanced directive. Especially since a legal representative would usually not help a person in 
drafting one. Therefore, in order for there to be compliance by health care workers standardised 
formalities had to be adhered to.58 This also served as a protection mechanism for the person 
drafting the advanced directive. It ensured that the advanced directive would be drafted 
voluntarily and with the full knowledge and acknowledgement of what was said in the document. 
                                                     
54 CP Sabatino “The Evolution of Health Care Advance Planning Law and Policy” (2010) 88(2) The Milbank Quarterly 
214-215.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid.   
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States have required many legal requirements in order to execute an advanced directive, these 
include the following:59  
• Standardised statutory form – having a standardised form was considered the safer option. 
It meant having one form that everyone could draft in accordance to the statute;60  
• Required disclosures and warnings – some states required that a notice be given to the 
person executing a healthcare power of attorney;61  
• Prescribed phrases for authorizing a person’s wishes –  specific matters are to be dealt with 
such as nutrition and hydration -  if the person’s wish is to withdraw nutrition and 
hydration. The state of Ohio, for example, was very specific in that the advanced directive 
should use the words “terminal condition” or “permanently unconscious state”.62 A further 
requirement included the person having to write in bold and in a different font that the 
attending physician may withhold or withdraw nutrition and hydration;  
• Witnessing requirements and restrictions – most states require two adult witnesses for 
executing an advance directive. The witness cannot be the substitute decision-maker, the 
treating physician or the physician’s staff. South Carolina has a further restriction on a 
spouse or anyone who is in charge of the person’s financial state of affairs to sign as a 
witness.63 Some states even require the advanced directive to be notarized as well as 
independently witnessed.61  
• Limitations on whom may act as a proxy/ substitute decision maker on health care – most 
states restrict who may be a proxy, especially on the healthcare provider and employees 
of the healthcare facility. Three states require the proxy to accept the appointment in 
writing.64   
                                                     
59 Ibid.  
60 These states included that of Alabama, Kansas, Utah, Oregon.  
61 These states included that of Ohio, Wisconsin, Nevada, Texas.  
62 Ohio’s Revised Code Section 2133.02 requires that the declarant’s declaration shall use either or both of the terms 
‘terminal condition’ and ‘permanently unconscious state’ and shall define or otherwise explain those terms in a 
manner that is substantially consistent with the provisions of the specified code section.  
63 South Carolina’s Code Section 62-5-504 also disqualifies the individual’s spouse and relatives; anyone directly 
financially responsible for the individual’s medical care or entitled to any portion of the individual’s estate; a 
beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the individual; and anyone who has a claim against the individual’s estate. 
61 These states are that of Montana, North Carolina and West Virginia.  
64 These states are Michigan, North Dakota and Oregon.  
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Further procedural requirements are imposed which include a medical diagnosis prerequisite of a 
terminal condition or permanent unconsciousness. Further limitations involve pregnant women, 
on a healthcare proxy making a decision on abortion, sterilization, psychosurgery and that 
involving nutrition and hydration.   
The conventionally advanced directive proved to not be as effective. Essentially the lack of 
effectiveness was as a result of the following:  
- less people used the legal tool considering that non-white racial and ethnic groups tend to 
have less knowledge and less likely to use advance directives.65 This is an interesting point 
to look at from a South African perspective. South Africa has a majority of ethnic groups 
living within the country. This raises the question of how effective would having the ability 
to draft an advanced directive be, if people within the country do not have much 
knowledge of what an advanced directive is and how to draft one?   
- people found it difficult to determine their healthcare wishes for an unidentified future 
confronted with unidentifiable illnesses with unpredictable treatments,66 the prescribed 
forms for the living will did not provide proper guidance with most people preferring 
instead to use a surrogate decision maker,67 the choices that people made had a tendency 
to change their goals and preferences for care,68 health care providers tend not to consider 
an advanced directive because they give preference to other factors such as prognosis, 
perceived quality of life and wishes of the family.69   
Communications Approach:  
In response to the failings of this legal transactional approach, an alternative paradigm was created 
known as the communications approach.70 This approach was derived from the more flexible less 
                                                     
65 J Kwak and WE Haley “Current Research Findings on End-of Life Decision Making among Racially or Ethnically 
Diverse Groups” (2005) 45(5) Gerontologist 634–641.  
66 A Fagerlin and CE Schneider “Enough: The Failure of the Living Will” (2004) 34(2) Hastings Center Report 30–42.  
67 N A Hawkins, PH Ditto, JH Danks and WD Smucker “Micromanaging Death: Process, Preferences, Values, and 
Goals in End-of-Life Medical Decision Making” (2005) 45(1) Gerontologist 107–117.  
68 CP Sabatino “The Evolution of Health Care Advance Planning Law and Policy” (2010) 88(2) The Milbank Quarterly 
214-215.  
69 SB Hardin and YA Yusufaly “Difficult End-of-Life Treatment Decisions: Do Other Factors Trump Advance   
Directives?” (2004) 164(14) Archives of Internal Medicine 1531–1533.  
70 CP Sabatino “The Evolution of Health Care Advance Planning Law and Policy” (2010) 88(2) The Milbank Quarterly 
214-215. 
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legal approach encompassing advance care planning. In addition to legal documentation, 
communication between patient, family and the physician is done in order to plan not only for 
healthcare but in regard to finances, family matters, spiritual beliefs and other issues that a person 
would like to plan for with regard to future health care.71   
The state of Oregon attempted a protocol using the same concept of advanced care planning. It is 
known as Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment, it aims at three elements; first 
communication between patient and caregiver along with the surrogate decision maker regarding 
salient end of life care treatment, the patient’s wishes is documented by a physician essentially 
becoming doctor’s orders to be kept with the patient’s medical records or with the patient that is 
homebound, thirdly the order is to be kept with the patient at all times of movement hence 
overcoming the issue of lack of continuity in care decision making and the order is to be recognised 
by all medical professionals from all facets of the profession. This approach is not an advanced 
directive but rather builds on the concept of advanced directives. It is a tool that considers the 
patient’s current health state, and healthcare goals and in the absence of an advanced directive a 
surrogate decision maker makes a decision. Research on the protocol indicated that it was 
successful in preventing unwanted resuscitations, encouraged discussion of end of life treatment 
options, and to make the patient’s wishes to be known and adhered to.72 It is submitted that a 
more communicative approach is needed and even though the advanced directive is the required 
outcome the process is emphasized on more than the form of the advanced directive. This would 
be especially more logical when considering the plight of most South Africans. By relying on a more 
communicative approach it would be easier for people to become more informed and allows for 
better understanding of advanced directives.   
Drafting an advanced directive is not as simple as sitting down and writing what you wish but rather 
it is a process. One that relies heavily on communication, understanding and acknowledgement of 
an advanced directive. The communicative approach seen within a South African context, would 
be an effective way of getting people to draft advanced directives.    
 
                                                     
71 Ibid.  
72 SE Hickman, CP Sabatino, AH Moss and JW Nester “The POLST Paradigm to Improve End-of-Life Care: Potential 
State Legal Barriers to Implementation” (2008) 36(1) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 119–140.  
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2.2. The United Kingdom Perspective   
In similar contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom found itself facing cases that 
highlighted the need for legislation concerning advanced directives. The significant cases that 
created a need for legislative intervention are the following stated below:  
2.2.1. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland73   
In this case, Mr. Anthony Bland was injured in a Hillsborough stadium disaster that left him in a 
persistent vegetative state in the year 1989. An application was brought by the medical team 
involved in Mr Bland’s treatment, asking the court to make an order granting withdrawal of 
nutrition and hydration and that only treatment that would allow him to die peacefully and in the 
utmost dignity as possible, be administered to him. The court’s decision placed emphasis on 
patient’s autonomy in refusing life-sustaining treatment and considered the possibility of giving 
such an instruction whilst competent and prior to being incapacitated. In light of this landmark 
decision, more cases dealt with a patient’s capacity to consent or refuse life-sustaining treatment 
and upheld the same principles as set out in the Bland case. It should be noted that this case 
highlighted that knowledge surrounding the refusal of treatment was not required by the patient. 
This case was not the first to establish legal recognition of a Living Will but it certainly was the 
most well-known case whereby the three judges had stated that had there been such a statement 
it would have been legally binding. This is an interesting point of the case since even though there 
was no legislation governing an advanced directive the courts were willing to recognise its validity 
under the common law.74 
2.2.2. Re C Adult: Refusal of Treatment75  
A paranoid schizophrenic patient at a hospital refused to consent to an amputation. The patient 
was delusional and was being held in custody after having stabbed his partner. In this case, the 
Honourable judge was of the opinion that, “a person may have capacity to manage his affairs even 
though he may suffer from schizophrenia.”76 Interestingly, here the court was willing to overlook 
                                                     
73 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland 1993; 1 All ER 821.  
74 Ibid. 
75 Re C. 1994; 1 All ER 819. 
76 Ibid. 
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the aspect of the patient being delusional and found that his right to self- determination prevailed 
even though abiding to the patient’s instructions would have led undeniably to his death. This case 
firmly enforced a patient’s right to refusal of treatment and appears to be in favour of the patient 
autonomy standpoint. It illustrated that a patient does not only have the capacity to refuse 
treatment but also continuation of care. This is an important advancement in favour of the 
underlying principle that advanced directives depend upon what is inevitably refusing to have life-
sustaining treatment in the future. Maclean submits an alternative argument from a cynic point of 
view since C was a dangerous schizophrenic who had committed murder and offered nothing to 
society that it did not matter as to whether he lived or died and therefore the choice that would 
inevitably cause his death was not given relevance.77 
2.2.3. Re AK: medical consent78  
In Re AK, this case involved a male 19-year-old who was suffering from a motor neuron disease.79 
Through eye movements, the patient requested that after two weeks of losing his ability to 
communicate the ventilator should be removed.80 The court took this as an advance directive 
verbally and had upheld the advanced directive. The court upheld the refusal of treatment and the 
removal of the ventilator was allowed. Unfortunately, the decision of the court can be argued 
against on the basis that the patient’s competence was limited taking into account the limited 
means of communication. Arguably this case does not apply much to patients who are 
incompetent at the time that a healthcare decision has to be made since this was a 
contemporaneous decision. However, these above-mentioned cases illustrated advanced 
directives to refuse life-sustaining treatment being upheld, Maclean argues that this was on the 
basis of there being a poor quality of life of the patient.81   
2.2.4. W Healthcare NHS Trust v. H 82                                                                                                                            
                                                     
77 AR Maclean “Advance Directives and the Rocky Waters of Anticipatory Decision-Making” (2008) 16 Medical Law 
Review 1-22. 
78 Re AK (2001) 1 F.L.R. 129 at 136. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid.  
81 AR Maclean “Advance Directives and the Rocky Waters of Anticipatory Decision-Making” (2008) 16 Medical Law 
Review 1-22. 
82 W Healthcare NHS Trust v H (2005) 1 W.L.R. 834.  
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A noteworthy case was the Court of appeal judgment in W Healthcare NHS Trust v H.83 The case 
involved a 59-year-old female patient suffering from a multiple sclerosis disease who needed 
twenty-four hour care. She lived a minimally cognitive existence even though she was conscious. 
She had previously stated some ten years ago that she did not want to be kept alive by machines; 
she had conveyed this to both family and close friends. The court chose to disregard this and did 
not regard it as an advanced directive. The reasoning provided was that even though she had 
mentioned machines there was no evidence that she was aware of the dying process due to 
starvation. Nor had a medical professional informed her on the ramifications of starving to death. 
Therefore, the court refused to uphold the oral advanced directive given by the patient. What is 
interesting about the decision is that the court was willing to uphold the advanced directive had 
she refused treatment of infections.84 Despite the fact that she had not mentioned anything about 
treatment regarding infections nor had she discussed the ramifications of infection with a medical 
profession. This may suggest that the decision was based on the manner of death as opposed to 
lack of value in the continuation of her life.  The case further cements the view that in principle 
patient autonomy is most important; in practice, it is the sanctity of life and patient’s welfare that 
is important.  
 
2.2.5. The Mental Capacity Act of 2005  
The Mental Capacity Act was enacted in 2005, seemingly with the aim to protect patient autonomy 
from a legislative level. It allows a person to have an influence on how they want to be cared for 
should that person lack the ability to make a decision in the future.  The Act85 looks at the issues 
of autonomy and formality, applicability of an advanced directive, continuing validity and 
applicability of an advance directive, incapacity and revocation, implementation of an advanced 
directive. Each of these will be discussed below:   
a) Autonomy and formality – the Act86 proceeds to keep the informality aspect of advanced 
directives.  The exception to the informality is when the directive applies to life sustaining 
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treatment, then it must be in writing and executed in the presence of a witness. 87 
Additionally, the Act also provides for informal revocations and any alterations.88 It appears 
that the legislators attempted to balance flexibility and facilitation against protection of 
the patient. However, allowing an advanced directive to be revoked by behaviour that is 
inconsistent leaves a space for interpretation that could lead to physicians and judges 
justifying an outcome they see as the best.89 Unfortunately, this is not conducive with the 
concept of self-determination and the importance of patient autonomy. There may be 
instances when a person makes a last-minute change of decision, the question then 
becomes is the formal advanced directive legally binding since a decision made during 
incapacity does not quite reflect an autonomous decision. 90  Furthermore, an informal 
revocation or alteration may not be conveyed to the correct medical professional and may 
not be adhered to or ignored. In an attempt at a compromise, it has been submitted that 
the responsibility should lie with the person to ensure the advanced directive is updated. 
Essentially the advanced directive is open to being challenged that said directive is the 
actual wish of the patient and the Act91 does not appear to counter this problem.92 This 
leads to the next issue, the applicability of advanced directives.  
b) Applicability of Advanced Directives – perhaps one of the more important issues with 
advanced directives is the difficulty of drafting sufficiently specific advanced directives, 
considering and anticipating future circumstances especially concerning the withdrawal of 
treatment. This understandably leaves advanced directives vulnerable to challenge. 
Section 24 of the Act93 requires that the directive should state specific treatment yet this 
may be in lay terms. Even if the circumstances are successfully stated in the directive it is 
still difficult to say for certain if a directive will be seen as applicable.94 This is because it 
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would be difficult for patients to specify the circumstances and therefore allows for the 
opportunity to be challenged by both doctors and judges.   
c) The Continuing Validity and Applicability of an Advanced Directive – in accordance to the 
English common law there is no time limit on the effectiveness of an advanced directive. 
Therefore, in principle an advanced directive that was written 20 years ago would still be 
as effective as one written 2 months ago. However, case law has suggested that the older 
the advanced directive the more “rigorous and anxious” would be the scrutiny.95 Instead 
of invalidating an advanced directive it has been suggested that to ensure patient 
autonomy is respected the better option would be to leave the responsibility to the patient 
themselves to ensure that they update their advanced directives. A better suggestion that 
has been put forward is that the advanced directive be regularly reviewed.96  Another 
approach was to impose a time limit on the validity of an advanced directive. 97 
Unfortunately, the Act does not make any provision for this instead it appears to be left to 
the healthcare professional to decide upon the applicability of the advanced directives.  
d) Incapacity and Revocation – if a person wishes to revoke an advanced directive it is 
required that the person should have capacity to do so. When it comes to the revocation 
it follows that the onset of incapacity would render an advanced directive irrevocable even 
if the person subsequently changes his or her mind.98  It has been suggested that the 
capacity required would be of a higher degree as opposed to that of a revocation of an 
advanced directive.99 The Mental Capacity Act s24 (3) states that a patient may withdraw 
or revoke an advanced directive as long as the patient has capacity. However, s25 (2) (c) 
states that an advanced directive will not be valid if the patient does anything else that is 
inconsistent with the directive. 100  The problem is that this section does not mention 
capacity, therefore, it can be interpreted to mean that it applies to behaviour even if the 
person lacks the capacity to revoke the directive.101 
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96 Code of Practice for the Mental Capacity Act of 2005. 
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e) Implementing an Advanced Directive – Under s26 of the Act,102 health practitioners are 
provided immunity against deciding if an advanced directive is valid and applicable. This 
particular provision gives a health practitioner a considerate amount of discretion without 
this discretion being objectively reasonable.103    
 
2.3. The Canadian Perspective   
During the 1980’s Canada did not pass natural death legislation, nevertheless, living wills were 
recognised under the common law.104 The development of advanced directives in Canada is as a 
result of their common law. Even though there is no uniform law on advanced directives there are 
provincial legislation that attempts to regulate such directives as can be seen in Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador. These provinces have legislation; 
however, it is not uniform and they differ in the form of the advanced directives as well as the 
minimum age requirement to draft an advanced directive. The statutes also differ with regards to 
the form of the advanced directive in each of the provinces.105 Canada’s most recent case was that 
of Bentley v Maplewood 106  and how the court dealt with the advanced directive was very 
interesting. This case shall be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
2.3.1. The Common Law Approach  
By the 1990’s the debate between respecting individual rights versus preserving life was more or 
less resolved. The courts had decided that a competent person has the right to determine what 
shall be done to their bodies.107   
                                                     
102 Mental Capacity Act of 2005. 
103 Ibid.   
104 M Brown “The law and practice associated with advance directives in Canada and Australia: Similarities, 
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In the Ontario court of appeal case of Malette v Schulman108 a female patient was brought into an 
emergency room severely injured and unconscious. The patient had carried a card that stated an 
unwillingness to undergo a blood transfusion due to her religious convictions. The attending 
doctor, however, had given her a blood transfusion. When the patient woke up and learned that 
she had been given a blood transfusion, she was mentally and emotionally distraught. This 
eventually led to the patient laying a charge against the doctor for damages in the battery. The 
court was of the opinion that the directive should have been followed despite the card not being 
witnessed or dated. The presiding officer stated "the right to determine what shall be done with 
one's own body is a fundamental right in our society. The concepts inherent in this right are the 
bedrock upon which the principles of self-determination and individual autonomy are based."109   
The second important case was also another Court of Appeal matter in Ontario.  Fleming v Reid110 
involved two psychiatric patients both of whom were competent and both having refused a 
particular treatment. They had refused treatment with the belief that even if they were to become 
incompetent their refusal of treatment would be binding. The attending physician resorted to 
relying on the guardian’s decision based on the patient’s best interests. The presiding officer 
Robins J.A stated that the right of a competent person in refusing medical treatment was 
entrenched in both the common law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.111 Section 
7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms stated that a patient may refuse in advance 
prospective treatment and it should be honoured even if such treatment would be beneficial or 
life-saving to the patient and no matter how ill-advised the decision may be.112 In 1995 the Senate 
Special Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide recommended that all jurisdictions should 
adopt legislation on advanced directives.113 Apart from the five provinces mentioned who have 
statute regulating advanced directives, other provinces cover advanced directives through 
implication. Ontario, Quebec and the Yukon have proxy legislation that allows a proxy to abide by 
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a patient’s previous request regarding his or wishes on treatment.114 Across Canada, the Living Will 
or a document called Let Me Decide “if drafted correctly” is generally accepted.  
All of these jurisdictions vary in some way or the other with regards to regulating advanced 
directives and in some aspects, the legislation works well in trying to achieve patient autonomy 
and respecting patient’s wishes. However, these legislations do not always achieve this outcome. 
Despite this, having legislation regulating advanced directives still helps to lessen issues and 
provides some sort of guidance when dealing with such matters.   
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Chapter 3: What are the Ethical Considerations Surrounding Advanced Directives?  
The ethics surrounding advanced directives extend from the principles of patient autonomy, well- 
being and respect for dignity.  
3.1. Patient Autonomy  
Medical ethics is dependent upon four ethical principles namely that of beneficence, 
nonmaleficence, patient autonomy and justice. Perhaps the most debated ethical concern in 
regard to advanced directives lies in that of patient autonomy. Patient autonomy, more specifically 
prospective patient autonomy forms the ethical basis in favour of advanced directives. Patient 
autonomy has been stated by Beauchamp and Childress115and described as follows:  
Personal autonomy is, at a minimum, self-rule that is free from both controlling 
interferences by others and from limitations, such as inadequate understanding, that 
prevent meaningful choice. The autonomous individual acts freely in accordance 
with a self-chosen plan, analogous to the way an independent government manages 
its territories and sets its policies.116  
 
From this definition, it can be inferred that the idea behind patient autonomy is having the choice 
to make decisions and having it adhered to, specifically in this case in making an advanced 
directive. Nevertheless, patient autonomy has been interpreted in different ways but the 
underlying concept of self-determination still remains. Ulrich defines autonomy in the following 
way: A person should be free to perform whatever action he/she wishes, regardless of risks or 
foolishness as perceived by others, provided it does not impinge on the autonomy of others by 
intentionally harming them.117 The ethical principle most linked with advanced directives is that 
of patient autonomy or self-determination. A mentally competent person has the moral right to 
make a decision concerning oneself, decisions that are based upon the person’s own values, 
culture and preferences. These decisions involve those that deal with treatment and end of life 
decisions. The connection between advanced directives and end of life decisions is when the 
patient refuses future treatment, a treatment that very well may be lifesaving to the patient.   
                                                     
115 TL Beauchamp and JF Childress Principles of Biomedical Ethics 5 ed (2001). 
116 TL Beauchamp and JF Childress Principles of Biomedical Ethics 5 ed (2001) 58.   
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3.2. Exercising Prospective Autonomy and its Ethical Concerns in Surrogate Decision Making:  
The majority opinion in literature points to the acceptance of an advanced directive having the 
same legal force as a contemporaneous refusal of treatment. 118  One such opinion is that of 
Dworkin, who explained the ethical foundations of prospective autonomy in light of refusing 
treatment.119 Dworkin’s argument is that the societal values of autonomy and dignity require the 
respect of critical interests of a person. Critical interests are those interests that reflect a person’s 
sense of identity and those interests that give rise to a person’s values.120 It has been suggested 
that the most important concern of a person refusing medical treatment is a way for that person 
to preserve his or her dignity when incompetent.121 Dworkin’s argument, therefore, suggests that 
an advanced directive ought to be adhered to on the basis of preserving a person’s critical interest 
namely how to live and how to die.122 According to Dworkin,123 there are two types of interests 
namely experiential and critical interests, it is the critical interest that is not confined to 
consciousness. Therefore, a person who is in a coma or a persistent vegetative state could very 
well still maintain their critical interests.  
3.3. Advanced Directives and Patient Autonomy  
At the heart of individuality is the concept of being able to make a decision about one’s wellbeing 
presently and prospectively. It involves including one’s social lifestyle, cultural background, 
educational background, religious belief and place within society. Preparing an advanced directive 
is a way for an individual to express their wishes and to have control over their welfare in the event 
of being incapacitated to make a decision in the future. The incapacitation can be either temporary 
or permanent. It is a reasonable expectation that the law should have mechanisms in the form of 
legislation that protects patient autonomy and the self-determination.  
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One of the mechanisms is to legitimize a durable power of attorney which is a type of advanced 
directive.  A durable power of attorney will allow a trusted person of the patient to make life-
sustaining or withdrawal of treatment decisions.   
Up until the year 2008, there were no guidelines for doctors to revert to when confronted with a 
living will. The Health Professional Council of South Africa (HPCSA) took a great step forward in 
creating ethical guidelines for just this purpose. The underlying principle of these ethical guidelines 
is that of patient autonomy. An example of this is the ability to refuse treatment even if such 
refusal would result in death.124 The HPCSA guidelines make the assumption that the provisions of 
the National Health Act 61 of 2003, allows patients to give a written mandate to a person or third 
party to act on their behalf when they are no longer competent to do so.125 Secondly, the HPCSA 
suggest that patients should actually be encouraged to appoint through a mandate a person to 
make decisions on their behalf. It makes provision, more importantly, for patients to be given the 
opportunity and be encouraged to write advanced directives in certain circumstances such as 
being in a permanent coma or having a terminal illness.126 The guidelines further mention the living 
will and it is interesting to note that the ethical guidelines appear to recognise a living will without 
there being legislation. Furthermore, the guidelines state that where a patient lacks the capacity 
to decide, health care practitioners must respect any advanced refusal of treatment. This can be 
interpreted to mean that an advanced directive could be stated orally or in written form. It is 
interesting to note that the ethical guidelines clearly recognise advanced directives and that 
advanced directives are generally accepted and abided by in medical practice. There is a clear 
discrepancy between the law and the ethical guidelines. There are many arguments against the 
legal recognition of advance directives. The argument such as the possibility of predicting the 
future which may lead to a vague advanced directive, refusing treatment may lead to missing out 
on new medical interventions, inability to change one's mind when a person has become 
incompetent and the denial of the primacy of individual identity.127 These are just a few of the 
arguments against the legal protection of advance directives.  
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There is little doubt that the future cannot be predicted. Perhaps one of the stronger negative 
arguments is that an advanced directive has to cover specific circumstances and not merely be a 
vague statement. When an advanced directive is in vague terms it creates a difficult situation for 
treating physicians to determine what medical treatment should be excluded. For example, in a 
situation where an advanced directive might state “I do not want my life to be prolonged when 
my condition is hopeless and request all treatment to be withheld”, the patient has brain damage 
and paralyzed yet not considered terminally ill. The same patient acquires pneumonia; it now 
becomes difficult for a doctor between withholding treatment or treating the pneumonia even 
though this would be against the patient’s wishes. If put in such a position, most doctors would 
make a decision based on what is in the best interests of the patient.   
Unfortunately, South Africa has not had litigation on advanced directives besides the case of Clarke 
v Hurst128 as discussed in the first chapter. However, Californian courts had many cases dealing 
with advanced directives ranging from patients who are in a coma or persistent vegetative state 
to patients who are seriously ill yet still cognitive.129 It began with the Quinlan case130 which was 
followed by the 1983 case of Barber v Superior Court.131 In both these cases, the court allowed for 
the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration at the request of the families. It is worth noting 
that in these cases the court had accepted oral advanced directives conveyed through family 
members. The next cases dealt with advanced directives but involved patients who were seriously 
ill but were fully cognitive, these cases were on the opposite end of the spectrum from its 
predecessors. In Bartling v Superior Court.132 a patient who was competent and suffering from 
emphysema, 133  an abdominal aneurysm 134  and lung cancer requested that his ventilator be 
removed whilst his physicians objected, the court held that the patient’s wishes should be upheld. 
In Bouvia v Superior Court,135 the court held that a quadriplegic patient with cerebral palsy should 
be allowed to request that her artificial nutrition and hydration be withdrawn. Following these 
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came two cases where the patients were neither comatose nor fully cognitive but in a persistent 
vegetative state. In Conservatorship of Drabick,136 a patient, who was a motor vehicle accident 
victim, was in a persistent vegetative state. The court held that a court-appointed conservator 
could require the physicians to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration. The case of 
Conservatorship of Morrison137 the patient was also in a persistent vegetative state, however, the 
outcome was different. The physicians refused to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration but 
they did offer to have the patient transferred to a facility so that withdrawal could be done. The 
court held that the physicians could refuse based on moral grounds but would be required to 
transfer the patient as they had offered. The cases had laid the foundation in dealing with 
surrogate decision makers and different types of patients. Then came the case of Conservatorship 
of Wendland,138 this case was unprecedented in that it occupied the space between competency 
and persistent vegetative state.   
In Conservatorship of Wendland,139interestingly the focus was upon the standard of proof that was 
needed to establish a patient’s wishes to the extent known. In Californian law the standard of 
proof in civil matters is based on a “balance of preponderance” and in criminal matters, the 
standard is “beyond a reasonable doubt.”140 A further standard of proof which seems to be in the 
middle of the two is “clear and convincing evidence”, which has been the standard for those civil 
cases that look at fundamental and important rights. Mr Wendland had sustained severe brain 
damage due to a motor vehicle accident; he was minimally conscious but completely dependent 
on others for basic needs and was unable to communicate. The court held that there was not 
adequate clear and convincing evidence to suggest the withdrawal of life support. Even though his 
wife had stated that Mr Wendland’s wish prior to his accident was not to be kept alive through a 
life support machine, especially if his condition was hopeless. The issue with this ruling is that the 
court has essentially concluded that a person’s preinjury statements have to be precise with regard 
to the nature of the condition and the intervention that they wish to be discontinued. It would 
appear that the Courts are reluctant in allowing the withdrawal of treatment or artificial nutrition 
and hydration if the person is minimally conscious or with dementia.  It has been argued that courts 
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have a tendency to equate oral statements made by patients prior to being mentally incompetent 
as an “emotional response to distressing situations.”132 The court was careful, however, to limit its 
decision: The clear and convincing evidence standard is justified “only when a conservator seeks 
to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a conscious, incompetent patient who has not left 
legally cognizable instructions for health care or appointed an agent or surrogate for health care 
decisions.” 141  This decision was based on the premise of clear and convincing evidence and 
without there being this standard of evidence, withdrawal of life support would be a violation of 
the person’s constitutional right to life. Essentially the lesson that can be learnt from the Wendland 
decision is that having an advanced directive such as a durable power of attorney for healthcare 
ensures that a patient’s wishes are adhered to. The lack of an advanced directive may be at the 
expense of patient autonomy.  
3.4. The Concept of Enduring Capacity  
The term capacity is an important term in respect of making a decision. The term capacity can be 
viewed within the medical context and within the legal context. In the legal context, capacity refers 
to a person’s ability to perform a specific juristic act.142 From a medical perspective, capacity 
relates to a clinical evaluation of an individual’s functional ability to make autonomous 
decisions.143 There is a link between the capacity to make decisions and autonomy. The basic idea 
behind making an advanced directive is having a decision to be made prospectively and not have 
it revoked on the basis of incapacity. Currently, South Africa does not have a statute that regulates 
this concept and it is with this in mind that a durable power of attorney is being advocated for in 
this dissertation.  
3.5. Conclusion  
If one were to accept the ethics of a competent person’s contemporaneous decision regarding 
withdrawal of treatment, then a person’s prospective decision should also be accepted. Ethics is 
basically our moral insights which form the standard of ethically acceptable conduct. 144 An apt 
                                                     
141 Conservatorship of Wendland supra.  
142 South African Law Commission Assisted Decision Making: Adults with impaired Decision – Making Capacity 
(2004). 
143 Ibid.  
144 WA Landman “End-of –Life decisions, ethics and the law: A case for statutory legal clarity and reform in South 
Africa” (2012) Ethics Institute of South Africa 17-19. 
32  
  
example is that of slavery, slavery was considered as an acceptable norm in society nowadays it is 
considered unthinkable in our current legal dispensation. The ever-evolving position of women 
globally is another prime example of how law and ethics are entwined and constantly evolving.   
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Chapter 4: A Legal Perspective of Advanced Directives Internationally and within 
South Africa   
 
 4.1. Introduction  
There has been a shift in thinking surrounding incompetent people, previously they used to be 
considered as simply dependent on others. The new wave of thinking is in line with respecting 
patient autonomy and dignity irrespective of a person being competent or incompetent. The focus 
has been more rights-based as opposed to a needs-based approach. These rights flow from 
International Guidelines, our Constitution, certain law and policy developments and sociological 
factors within South Africa. A legal approach towards advanced directives will be discussed in this 
chapter beginning with some international guidelines and looking at both international and South 
African case law.  
4.2. International Guidelines   
The World Medical Association Declaration of Venice on Terminal Illness145 was one of the initial 
legal instruments that focused on decisions surrounding terminally ill persons. This Declaration 
looks at issues of care of terminally ill patients by placing the responsibility on the physician to 
assist the patient “in maintaining an optimal quality of life through controlling symptoms and 
addressing psychosocial needs enabling the patient to die with dignity and in comfort”.146 The 
Declaration makes further provisions that physicians should take steps in encouraging patients to 
develop written advanced directives. 
The new trend in comparable jurisdictions have now made provision for durable powers of 
Attorney, initially, living wills were used however many issues arose leading to the legislators 
introducing the Enduring Power of Attorney. Essentially this type of advanced directive allows for 
the patient’s wishes and for the input of a surrogate who in all likelihood will be aware of the 
patient’s beliefs and values. Surrogate decision makers have two main responsibilities in other 
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jurisdictions, firstly to exercise rights on behalf of the mentally incompetent or incapacitated 
patient and secondly to protect the rights and interests of the patient.147 Legislation has attempted 
to achieve a balance between autonomy and paternalism. This is quite important because it 
creates a balance that strives towards the best interest of the patient. Apart from balancing the 
rights of the patient, all of the jurisdictions have attempted either minimally or to a greater extent 
to balance procedural considerations and welfare considerations. Generally, priority is given to 
family members or next of kin with regard to surrogate decision making.  It should be borne in 
mind, however, that even though other jurisdictions such as the United States, Canada, etc. have 
managed to create this legal reform, developing countries do not have the same circumstances. 
Legal reform has to be achieved with specificity in accordance with a developing country’s 
particular needs and vulnerabilities.   
The reality of developing countries is quite different from first world countries and therefore a 
more African perspective is required especially for South Africa. In the end, it is the prevailing 
circumstances of a country that determines how that country should deal with regulating 
advanced directives. African countries differ a great deal from Western countries with regard to 
beliefs, culture, sociological perspectives and economics. In a recent study conducted in Kenya, it 
was revealed that within the African culture the discussion of death in itself is seen as a taboo.148 
It is not uncommon for most people living in Africa to have minimal knowledge of advanced 
directives. This was evident in the study that was conducted in 2017, which involved two hundred 
and sixteen (216) patients. Out of the two hundred and sixteen (216) patients who were terminally 
ill, only eighty-nine (89) patients had advanced directives. The rest of the one hundred and twenty-
seven (127) patients had no advanced directives drafted. The results of the study can be attributed 
to most people not having enough knowledge about advanced directives. Those patients who had 
advanced directives were usually people who had had the opportunity of discussing it with their 
physicians.149  It can be concluded that a communicative approach plays a pivotal role in the 
drafting and advanced directives. This is relevant within a South African context considering socio-
economic backgrounds of the majority of South Africans.  
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4.3. Constitutional Principles Applicable to Advanced Directives 
With the advent of the South African Constitution150 in 1996, rights such as dignity, equality and 
freedom have been entrenched in our country. This constitutional protection is afforded to 
everyone in South Africa including those who are competent and incompetent alike.151 This is 
firmly entrenched in Section 9 of the Constitution which is the equality clause. It has been argued 
that the right to equality is linked with the right to dignity. The Constitution affords the right of 
inherent dignity to everyone, a right that ought to be respected and protected. In Hoffmann v 
South African Airways152, the Honourable Ngcobo J set out the link between these rights and the 
importance of the link.   
    
“At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination is the recognition that under 
our Constitution all human beings, regardless of their position in society, must be 
accorded equal dignity. That dignity is impaired when a person is unfairly 
discriminated against. The determining factor regarding the unfairness of the 
discrimination is its impact on the person discriminated against. Relevant 
considerations in this regard include the position of the victim of the discrimination 
in society, the purpose sought to be achieved by the discrimination, the extent to 
which the rights or interests of the victims of the discrimination have been affected, 
and whether the discrimination has impaired the human dignity of the victim.”153  
  
Not respecting what a patient chooses in respect of treatment is a type of discrimination based on 
incompetence or disability. When a competent person makes a decision and then is incapacitated 
subsequently that person is still the same person and therefore should retain that identity through 
the advanced directive.  
Section 10 of the Constitution involves the right to dignity which is afforded to all people within 
South Africa. The right to dignity is not only recognised it has to be protected in the true spirit of 
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the Constitution. In respect of incompetent people with advanced directives, their inherent dignity 
is being portrayed through a substitute decision maker or their advanced directive document that 
states their wishes or belief.  
The National Health Act 154  mentions that family members or others may make health care 
decisions as substitute decision makers. Although this is a step in the right direction, it does raise 
concerns when medical practitioners are requested to withdraw or withhold treatment as directed 
by a substitute decision maker. Importance should be given to how a person chooses to live. A 
person living a life they value as dignified should be focused upon especially in respect of 
healthcare decisions and the refusal of life-sustaining treatment. Many incompetent patients are 
simply confined to bed, cannot move or speak, cannot use the basic amenities of life and 
completely confined to relying on someone else for everything from eating to defecating. It is 
doubtful anyone would classify this as being a fulfilled and dignified way of living. It is submitted 
that human dignity ought to be protected right up to and including the moment of death. 
Accordingly, even a person who is not competent ought to retain the right to dignity more 
specifically through a durable power of attorney.    
Section 11 of the Bill of Rights states that “everyone has a right to life”.155 The right to life was a 
concept which was substantially dealt with in the Constitutional case of S v Makwanyane.156 From 
this decision, it can be further concluded that the right to life has a more broad and wider meaning 
as opposed to a narrow approach.157 This point was aptly stated in the remarks of  
O’Regan J in S v Makwanyane:158    
But the right to life was included in the Constitution not simply to enshrine the 
right to existence. It is not life as mere organic matter that the Constitution 
cherishes but the right to human life; the right to live as a human being, to be 
part of a broader community, to share in the experience of humanity.  
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In her concurring opinion, O’Regan J managed to capture the essence of the right to life. Living 
cannot be seen simply from a mechanical perspective. To live is much more than existing in a 
visceral sense. It has been argued that human life is more than a simple continuation of 
breathing159 this is certainly true, living means to experience life with emotions, understanding 
and appreciation.  Therefore, an extension to this right to life could include us as individuals having 
a say in the type of life we wish to lead. Legislation that makes allowance for a person to make an 
autonomous decision and which promotes the adherence to such a decision is in line with an open 
and democratic society. Professor Geoffrey Falkson has correctly said, “The accent should be on 
the sacredness of the quality of life, rather than the sacredness of life per se.” 160 Technically 
speaking the Constitution161 provides for the right to live but does not impose a duty to live.  
Section 12(2) of the Constitution162 affords the right to bodily and psychological integrity. It is the 
idea of integrity that is especially relevant with regard to self-determination and autonomy. 
Section 12 of the Constitution163 protects the right of self-determination with regard to one’s body 
against interference from others and the State. The right to self-determination directly stems from 
patient autonomy.164 Even though these rights are stated in the Constitution165 it should be borne 
in mind that these rights are not absolute and subject to Section 36 of the Constitution.166 This 
section is the limitation clause, which provides that rights may be limited as long as the limitation 
is reasonable and justifiable.167 The more severe the limitation the more the justification has to be 
provided for that limitation. A legal issue is made when self-determination or patient autonomy 
has to be limited when the choices that are made need legal intervention. For example, when a 
person has become mentally incompetent, the law may be required to intervene to act in the best 
interests of that now incompetent person. Recognizing patient autonomy as a constitutional right 
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means that the limitation or interference in this right has to be as minimal as possible. South 
African legal experts have expressed a unanimous opinion that in cases when there is diminished 
capacity or absence of autonomy the Court or a legally appointed substitute decision maker would 
be required to substitute its own decision for the autonomous judgment that would have been 
made by the incapacitated person.168 Essentially the right to self-determination demands that the 
decision gives primary weight to patient autonomy. 169  The respect for patient autonomy is 
demonstrated in the HPCSA’s General Ethical Guidelines, the relevant parts being the medical 
practitioner’s obligation to respect a patient’s right to self-determination. 170  As the right to 
physical integrity which includes the ability to make an autonomous decision is enshrined in the 
Bill of rights, there is a general legal obligation on medical practitioners to respect this right.156The 
further implication being that any intervention from the law into people’s lives should be as 
minimal as possible.  
Section 14 of the Constitution171 encompasses the right of privacy. In Bernstein v Bester172 a matter 
that was before the Constitutional Court where Judge Ackerman discussed this right and stated:  
"The scope of privacy has been closely related to the concept of identity and it has been stated 
that 'rights like the right to privacy, are not based on a notion of the unencumbered self, but on 
the notion of what is necessary to have one's own autonomous identity... In the context of privacy, 
this would mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a person, such as his or her family life, sexual 
preference and home environment, which is shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the 
community.”173 
The relevance of this judgment is that it speaks to the essence of having the right to privacy as an 
individual. It embraces patient autonomy and inner sanctum which means that a person has a 
choice not to live a life filled with pain and suffering.174 Arguably, this could mean that a person 
may choose to have an advanced directive or to have a surrogate decision maker, and make a 
choice of withdrawal of treatment. If advanced directives were legislated and regulated 
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accordingly it would allow for a person’s right to privacy being protected. Of course, not only the 
right to privacy would be protected but so would the other accompanying rights such as the right 
to dignity, right to life and the right to freedom of choice would be protected. This would be 
bearing in mind the limitation clause i.e. section 36 of the Constitution.175   
4.4. Recent Case Law Involving an Advanced Directive   
Within South Africa besides that of Clarke v Hurst,176 have not been any advanced directive related 
cases appearing before the court. This may be disadvantageous in the sense that the common law 
has not been developed in South Africa regarding advanced directives. Unfortunately, even further 
is that in Clarke v Hurst177 the Court did not validate the living will of the patient. The essence of 
the judgment was that the discontinuance of medical treatment in these circumstances would not 
be considered unlawful. The reasoning behind the judgement was also not based on the advanced 
directive. Therefore, even though it is an important case, foreign case law has to be considered in 
order to ascertain how to deal with advanced directives from a court’s perspective. Foreign case 
law will be helpful and can be used as a reference point, however; it will not be seen as binding 
within South Africa. Currently, there is no reported judgment directly ruled on with regard to 
advanced directives.  
 
4.4.1. Bentley v Maplewood Seniors Care Society                                                                                  
One of the most important decisions dealing with advanced directives is the Canadian case of 
Bentley v. Maplewood Seniors Care Society178 which was first before the British Supreme Court 
and then before the British Columbia Supreme Court of Appeal.  
The case involved one Margot Bentley who was an 83-year-old woman who suffered from 
Alzheimer’s disease. During her earlier and healthier years Margot Bentley, who was a nurse, 
expressed that after witnessing patients in a persistent vegetative state due to Alzheimer’s 
disease, she would not want to be kept in the same way. She went even further by drafting and 
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signing an advanced directive stating family members as proxies to make healthcare decisions on 
her behalf, essentially an enduring power of attorney.  
The court a quo179 had to deal with a number of issues however only the relevant ones will be 
discussed further:  
• Whether Mrs Bentley was currently capable of making the decision to accept nourishment 
and assistance with feeding?   
The Honourable Judge Greyell ruled that Mrs Bentley was indeed capable of making the decision 
to accept nutrition and was providing her consent through her behaviour when she accepts 
nutrition and liquids.164 This was based on various factors namely the petitioners, in this case, had 
failed to show that Mrs Bentley was not capable of making a decision involving eating and drinking, 
the judge favoured the one expert’s opinion over the other’s. The BC Court of Appeal agreed with 
Judge Greyell and reaffirmed that what was required of the petitioners was to counter the 
presumption that Mrs Bentley was capable of giving consent.180   
• Does assistance with feeding fall within the definition of healthcare or personal care?  
The judge stated that the British Columbia’s Health Care Consent and Care Facility Admission Act 
(HCCCFA Act) does not define oral nutrition or hydration under health care.181 The Judge further 
looked at the Representation Agreement Act which included the term diet under the definition of 
personal care, along with shelter, dress, participation in activities, licenses and permits.182 The 
reasoning for the decision was since a representation agreement can authorize decisions about 
personal care as well as healthcare and since nutrition, assistance with eating and meal planning 
fell under community care, the inference made was eating and drinking must be personal care 
matters and not healthcare.183   
• Could Mrs Bentley’s statement of wishes be considered as an advanced directive?  
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Advanced directives need to be specifically worded in order to be recognised as one. In this case 
Mrs Bentley indicated that her husband or daughter could make a decision on her behalf. In order 
for this statement to be recognised as an advanced directive, the Court was of the opinion that no 
one should be selected as a temporary decision maker.184 In this case, Mrs Bentley indicated 
surrogate decision makers and therefore, it was not recognised as an advanced directive.  
• If Mrs Bentley is unable to make a decision on nourishment, who has the authority to make 
the decision?  
There is a representative agreement that exists under the Representation Act in British 
Columbia.185 Under this Act186 a person may nominate a substitute decision maker, it sets out the 
requirements for the agreement to come into effect. If Mrs Bentley had filled out the RA9 form 
under this act she could have nominated her husband or daughter to make a decision on her 
behalf. The RA9 form allows a representative to even refuse healthcare according to the person’s 
wishes, even if this would lead to that person’s eventual death. The court refused to consider the 
statement of wishes as an advanced directive. Even if it did consider the statement it would not 
have made a difference in this case as advanced directives only apply to healthcare and in this 
case, the issue was personal care.187   
The lesson that can be appreciated from this case is that South Africa would have to ensure that 
when recognising advanced directives, it should be applicable to all types of medical care including 
personal care like that of feeding. In so far as definitions of healthcare is concerned our current 
legislation does not specifically define the term “healthcare” and our courts may very well face the 
same issue of the British Columbian Court. Another point coming from the Bentley v Maplewood188 
case is how specific an advanced directive should be for the court to consider it in its decision. 
Interestingly, the United Kingdom’s legislation has a similar approach with regard to the specificity 
of an advanced directive. The United States Supreme Court decision Re Quinlan189 , unlike the 
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Bentley case, didn’t look at the definition of nutrition and hydration and if it had it is questionable 
whether the court would have come to a similar decision as that of the Canadian case  
The reality of most South Africans is that to predict precisely a consequence may very well be an 
almost impossible task. Medical knowledge in itself is confusing and the ordinary South African 
may not even be literate, this could potentially create a lot of reluctance in drafting an advanced 
directive in the first instance. However, perhaps a better option would be to introduce a procedure 
similar to that of HIV testing counselling, whereby people are counselled and informed by health 
care workers on advanced directives and how it should be drafted.  
Substitute decision-makers may be tasked with deciding upon treatment with regard to pain relief 
and distress apart from just life-sustaining treatment. The South Africa Law Commission Report, in 
its draft legislation, looked at this aspect but from a health care practitioner’s perspective. The 
report suggested that a health practitioner may increase the dosage of pain medication even if 
that would lead to a patient’s death as long as certain formalities were abided by, like a prescribed 
record keeping.190 The conclusion that can be drawn from this being that comfort care can be 
indemnified from civil and criminal liability as long as a responsible clinical judgment has been 
made. In a similar stance, if a substitute decision maker were to make a decision that is carefully 
considered and in the best interest of the patient, then there should be no legal liability on the 
part of the health care practitioner. This should also be the case in withdrawal or withholding life-
sustaining treatment which could potentially lead to the patient’s death.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
190 South African Law Commission Euthanasia and the artificial preservation of life (1998).  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to offer a conclusion to this dissertation, hopefully having asserted the need 
and demand for legislative regulation of advanced directives. It should be noted that the 
conclusion will be divided into two parts, one that refers to advanced directives drafted by a 
competent person who subsequently becomes incompetent. The second part of the conclusion 
will focus on surrogate decision making, whereby a competent person makes an advanced 
directive and appoints a third person to act as a surrogate decision-maker regarding healthcare or 
withdrawal of treatment. Throughout this dissertation, advanced directives and durable power of 
attorney has been mentioned and at times interchangeably, therefore, an explanation has been 
provided to create clarity on the terms.  
5.2. Advanced Directives   
As previously mentioned an advanced directive are instructions given by patients regarding their 
future treatment should they become incompetent to consent to, or refuse such treatment.191 An 
advanced directive allows a person to have the opportunity of making a future medical decision 
or by electing a proxy to make a medical decision for a patient who is unable to make a decision 
for themselves. It is worth noting that a durable power of attorney is a form of an advanced 
directive and hence it has been referred to interchangeably throughout the dissertation. The only 
difference between these is that in one the person’s wishes are stated and with a durable power 
of attorney it is the substitute decision maker who states what the person’s wishes are regarding 
treatment or withdrawal thereof.   
Legislation should state that a competent person has the right to contemporaneously make a 
decision regarding prospective life-sustaining treatment.192 It has been argued that this would at 
least clear our case law’s recognition of a patient’s right to refuse life - saving treatment.193 
Artificial nutrition and hydration ought to be recognised as medical treatment, which would clear 
                                                     
191 D McQuoid Mason “Advanced Directives and the National Health Act” (2006) 12 South African Medical Journal 
1236.  
192 WA Landman “End-of –Life decisions, ethics and the law: A case for statutory legal clarity and reform in South 
Africa” (2012) Ethics Institute of South Africa 17-19.  
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any ambiguity. Naturally, when this is withdrawn it should be accompanied by comfort care 
treatment and pain management treatment.   
Advanced directives are legally recognised in international law as discussed, in South Africa, the 
National Health Act194 does identify advanced directives but fails to properly define terms like 
Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney.   
 5.2.1. Advantages and Recommendations regarding Advanced Directives   
• One of the main advantages of legislating advanced directives means that people who 
become incompetent can have their rights protected legally. Legislation can provide clarity 
on matters such as temporary incapacity, persistent vegetative state patients and 
withdrawal of treatment.  
• The South African courts are currently overflowing with matters to appear before a 
Magistrate or Judge. Therefore, by creating a legal guideline for doctors and patients, it 
prevents the unnecessary step of appearing in court and thus overloading the courts.  
• The state of the health care system is under great financial stress and resources are 
extremely limited. The hospitals cannot accommodate all patients, as there are 
overcrowding and downgrading or shutting down of hospitals due to financial constraints. 
Care of the terminally ill and those in persistent vegetative state is very expensive. It 
appears more logical not to expend the already scarce health care resources on these 
patients.  
5.3. Durable Power of Attorney  
Currently, South Africa does not have any law relating to a durable power of attorney. In our law, 
a power of attorney is a declaration whereby one person delegates the power to make decisions 
on behalf of that authorizer.195 This is not the only manner in which a person may be authorized 
to act on behalf of another person, for example when a court appoints a curator to a person or the 
property of another person.196 Unfortunately, our law does not make provision for a durable 
power of attorney for healthcare. A durable power of attorney is a special type that manages to 
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195 De Wet Law of South Africa Vol 1 par 116. 
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focus on the persons wishes even when that person has become incompetent and unable to make 
a choice regarding health care. A substitute decision maker can, therefore, act on behalf of the 
now incompetent person.  
Many are under the impression that having an ordinary power of attorney confers the right to 
make decisions for another who has become incapacitated. This is false; a power of attorney 
ordinarily does not continue to be valid, since a power of attorney ends when a person’s capacity 
ends. This is precisely the reason why a durable power of attorney should be introduced into our 
law. Another pertinent issue regarding advanced directives is that patients assume that in practice 
their advanced directives will be adhered to by the doctors. However, the reality is that an 
advanced directive has to be specific and if it is not specific to the patient’s circumstances then it 
is most likely that the advanced directive will not be taken into consideration.197 It is common 
practice that when decisions need to be made regarding incapacitated patients, it is usually the 
family members who make decisions even though they have no legal basis upon which they may 
act. This has the potential to expose these family members to personal liability.    
Our law currently deals only with decision making incapacity and recognizes a curator to handle 
the affairs of the incapacitated person or to have legal standing to take up matters in court. Similar 
to a curator, a surrogate decision-maker, if recognised, would be able to make health care 
decisions on behalf of a patient without that decision being overridden by family members or 
health care professionals. In so far as the surrogate decision-maker acts in the best interest of the 
patient and in line with the patient’s wishes. It might be a good idea to have a monitoring system 
like that in British Colombian Representative Agreement Act, whereby there is an appointed 
monitor who oversees the decisions of the surrogate decision maker and that the best interests of 
the patient are being taken into account.  
5.3.1. Advantages of a Durable Power of Attorney                                                                                    
A primarily significant advantage is that essentially it is the patient who is making a decision 
about healthcare even if the decision is not contemporaneous.    
• The introduction of statutory substitute decision making will solve issues that involve the 
so-called grey areas of temporary incapacity.  
                                                     
197 R Ingle “End-of-life decisions (Letters)” (2008) 98(5) South African Medical Journal 332.  
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• The best interests of incompetent persons will be focused upon especially if legislation 
recognizes and enforces this right.  
• “Proper safeguards should be built into the process to protect the interests of the principal. 
These should include execution safeguards; triggering event safeguards (i.e. safeguards 
conclusively establishing or indicating whether the agent can continue to validly act under 
an enduring power of attorney or start validly acting under a conditional power of 
attorney); and supervisory safeguards.”198  
• When a substitute-decision maker is making healthcare decisions, it should be on the basis 
of appropriate standards in the circumstances such as:   
- Based on what the decision maker knows about the patient, an inference based on 
what the patient would have actually wanted;  
- By placing oneself in the position of the patient and deducing what the patient would 
have probably wanted in the circumstances; and  
- By inevitably choosing the option that would objectively reap the highest benefit for 
the patient.199  
- In cases where there is no advanced directive but a substitute decision maker, the same 
principles of the appropriate standard of care would apply.200   
Substitute - decision-makers ultimately stand in for a patient when the patient has become 
incompetent. This type of power of attorney can either be one where the patient has given the 
substitute decision maker specific instructions or one where the patient has basically left the 
decision up to the substitute. The decision maker is then dependent on the situation and 
circumstances surrounding a patient’s condition.  When deciding if life-sustaining treatment 
should be withheld or withdrawn, what needs to be determined is the appropriateness of the 
treatment.201 The goal of the treatment should be to the benefit of the patient. If there is no life 
possible even if vital functions are sustained artificially, there is no point in continuing treatment.  
Essentially merely having a biological life with no prospect of conscious life, is a treatment that has 
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199 WA Landman “End-of –Life decisions, ethics and the law: A case for statutory legal clarity and reform in South 
Africa” (2012) Ethics Institute of South Africa 17-19. 
200 Ibid.   
201 Ibid.   
47  
  
an inappropriate goal. In a persistent vegetative state patient, for example, withholding antibiotics 
for a life-threatening infection would be ethically justifiable since meaningful life or recovery to a 
conscious state would unattainable and impossible. This would still be ethically justifiable if such 
withholding of treatment would inevitably lead to the patient’s death. Drawing from the Clark v 
Hurst 202  decision, if the discontinuance of treatment would be wrongful based on the legal 
convictions of our society and whether it would be reasonable within the circumstances of the 
patient’s illness, should be the test in deciding lawfulness of the decision. The other justification 
which is extrinsically based is that within South Africa we cannot afford futile treatment on any 
patient. South Africa has barely enough resources to treat patients and treating a patient with a 
very bad prognosis would be a waste of already scarce medical resources that we cannot afford.   
By formally introducing this concept it would not only create legal certainty, which in any event is 
being adhered to in practice anyway. It will increase the awareness of a durable power of attorney 
as it is not generally known that it ends with a person’s capacity. When introduced formally the 
concept will be properly regulated and incapacitated person’s wishes will still be upheld and 
protected.  
From a practical perspective, people will need to be educated on advanced directives and the 
different types of advanced directives, how to draft an advanced directive, availability in acute 
care settings and long term care.203  
5.4. Conclusion 
Legal clarity will assist in providing guidance for substitute decision makers and healthcare 
practitioners, protection of a patient’s wishes and respect for patient autonomy, protection for 
healthcare practitioners and decision-makers who act in accordance to lawful medical practice. It 
will provide peace of mind for family members knowing that they don’t need to become entangled 
in stressful and tedious legal litigation. Health care practitioners will not fear litigation and issues 
in respect of advanced directives with or without substitute – decision makers. 
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